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AT& T MOBILITY AND FAA OVER-PREEMPTION 
Jill Gross' 
It is no secret that pre-dispute arbitration clauses in adhesive consumer and employment 
agreements have been harshly criticized in this country in recent years. Critics label these 
clauses, which often contain one-sided provisions, such as class arbitration waivers and 
inconvenient venue and cost-shifting provisions, as oppressive and unfair to those with inferior 
bargaining power.' 
The Supreme Court's most recent decisions under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA,,)2 
have only exacerbated this ongoing debate. These rulings have stripped the arbitrators of the 
power 10 construe silence in an arbitration agreement as consent to class arbitration,~ reaffirmed 
the arbitrability of federal statutory claims,4 upheld a clause in an arbitration agreement 
de\cgating to arbitrators the power to rule on the unconscionability of the arbitration clause,s and 
enforced a class arbitration waiver in an arbitration agreement.6 Among other impacts, these 
decisions have effectively foreclosed the ability of consumers and employees to pursue low-dollar 
value claims, as they can no longer consolidate them in an arbitration proceeding.7 
These decisions clearly reflect the Court's strong support of arbitration agreements. That 
strong support docs not come without a cost, however, as these decisions also severely limit the 
states' powers to police the fairness of arbitration agreements. In particular, the Court's decision 
in AT&T Mobility LLC v. ConcepcionK expands the FAA preemption doctrine beyond its prior 
boundaries, signaling how far the Court is willing to go to support arbitration clauses at the 
expense of states' rights and the values of federalism. This article will explore the impact of 
AT&T Mobility on the preemption of state law and the concomitant impact on the balance 
Professor of Law, Director of Legal Skills and Director, Investor Rights Clinic, Pace Law School. 
I See, e.g., Richard M. Alderman, Pre-DisJllIIe Mandat(It)1 Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A Call for 
Reform, 38 Hous. L. REV. 1237 (200 I); Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost oj Mandatol)' ConslImer Arbitration, 67 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 133 (2004); Sarah Rudolph Cole, incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against EI!forcemelll (II' 
EXeCII/OI:l.' Ari>it/'uli(J/1 Agreements Between Employer.\' and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449 (1996); David S. 
Schwartz. Enforcing Small Prillt to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Cluims in an Age (!f' 
C(lmpe.'/ed Al'hiII'Uli()f1, 1997 WIS. L. REv. 33 (1997); Jean R. Stemlight, Creeping Mandalory Arhitralion: Is II Jllsl? 
57 STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005); Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or C0/1}()l'ate Toot!: Debunking the Supreme COllrt',\' 
Preference lor Binding Arbitration, 74 WASil. U. L. Q. 637 (1996); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: 
Conllnlmi(l' und Coercion Under the Federal Arhitrutio" Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931 (1999). BlIt see Stephen J. Ware, 
The Cuse for Enforcing Adhesive Ai'hitration Agreements- With Particular Consideration of Class Actions und 
Al'bilrution Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 264 (2006) (arguing against legislation prohibiting enrorccment of adhesive pre-
dispute arbitration agreements and stating that "the genernl enforcement of adhesive arbitration agreements benefits 
society as a whole by reducing process costs and, in particular, benefits most consumers, employees and other adhering 
parties"). 
" 9 U.S.c. §~ 1-16 (2007) . 
.1 Set! Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFceds Inl'l. Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (20 I 0). 
4 CompuCrcuit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012). 
~ Rcnt-A-Ccntcr, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). 
" 131 S. Ct. 1740(2011). 
J S(!e Jean Sternlight, TsulJami: AT&T MolJility v. Concepcion Impedes Access 10 jllstice. 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 
723 (2012); Sarah Cole, On Bahies and Bathl1'ater: The Arhitraticm Fail'l1ess Act Gnd the Supreme Cuurt's Recent 
Arbitrulion Jurisprudence, 48 Hous. L. REV. 457 (2011). 
, AT&T MoM/i!)', 131 S. Ct. at 1740. 
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bctween statc and federal power in the arbitration arena . This articlc argucs that AT&T Mohility 
rcsults in FAA ovcr-prccmption,q as it unduly shifts arbitration law-making power away from the 
states, in violation of the FAA's savings clause. 
I. THE FAA PREEMrnON DOCTRINE 
Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 "to ovclTule the judiciary ' s long-standing refusal to 
enforce agreements to arbitrate."lo Animated by thc overarching principle of contractual 
autonomy, the FAA's primary purpose was to "require[] courts to enforce privately negotiated 
agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance with their terms.,,11 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA to embody a strong national policy favoring 
arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. I} In the past twenty-five years, the 
Court's FAA jurisprudence has imbued the FAA with super-status: it governs virtually every 
arbitration clause arising out of a commercial transaction,13 and its substantive provisions apply in 
both state and federal court. 14 Although it is well-settled that the FAA does not create federal 
subject matter jurisdiction, '5 the Court has declared repeatedly that the FAA "creates a body of 
federal substantive Jaw of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the 
coverage of the ACt.,,16 
Another consistent holding in the Supreme Court's FAA jurisprudence is that its primary 
substantive provision, § 2, which declares that agreemcnts to arbitrate are "valid, irrevocablc, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract"l? preempting state laws that place an arbitration agreement on unequal footing from 
other contracts.1K Under the FAA preemption doctrine, § 2 preempts in federal and state court 
any state law that "actually conflicts with federal law, that is, to the extent that it 'stands as an 
9 I have previollsly argued that state courts over-preempt their own laws providing grounds to vacate arbitration 
awards. See JillY. Gross, Over-Preemption OrSlale Vacatur Law: Slate CO/I/"Is and Ihe FAA , 3 J. AM. ARB. 1 (2004). 
IU Volt Info. Scis. , Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,478 (1989); Dean Witter 
Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213,219-20 (1985). 
II Va/I, 489 U.S. at 478. 
12 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Moses H. Cone Mem'l 
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U .S. I, 24 (1983) (recognizing a " liberal federal policy favoring arbitration 
agreements"). 
13 By its terms, the FAA governs agreements to arbitrate involving "transactions involving commerce." 9 U.S.c. 
§ 2 (20 I 0). The Supreme Court has interpreted this phrase very broadly to include any transaction that inJact involves 
interstate commerce, even if the parties did not anticipate an interstate impact. See Citizens Bank v. Alafabco. Inc .• 539 
U.S. 52 (2003) (applying FAA to debt restructuring agreements as "involving commerce"); Howsam v. Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002) (applying FAA to securities arbitrations); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 
513 U.S. 265, 273-74, 281 (1995) (interpreting the reach of the FAA broadly to all transactions "involving commerce" 
and stating that "'involving' is broad and is indeed the functional equivalent of 'arrecting"'). 
14 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. I, 12 (1984) ("The statements of the Court in Prima Paillt that the 
Arbitration Act was an exercise of the Commerce Clause power clearly implied that the substantive rules of the Act 
were to apply in state as well as federal courts."). 
15 See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 59 (2009); Hall Street Assoc., L.L.c. v. MatteI. Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 
581-82 (2008); Moses H. Calle Mem'/ Hasp., 460 U.S . at 25 11.32. 
I" See, e.g., Moses H. Calle Mem '/ Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24. The Court defined arbitrability in this context as "the 
duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate." [d. at 25 n.32. 
17 9 U.S.c. § 2. This latter phrase of § 2 is known as the FAA '5 "savings clause." I. See Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008). 
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obstacle to thc accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress . ",19 
Thus, FAA precmption is a sub-spccics of "conflict preemption" known as "obstacle 
. ,,:w preemption. 
The FAA's substantive provision, § 2, reflects a classic federalism balance. On the one 
hand, it displaces conflicting state law. Through FAA obstacle preemption, the Supreme Court 
has rebuffed state law-bascd dcfcnses to the enforcement of arbitration agreements to the extent 
those defenses single out arbitration agreements for hostile treatment? Thus, the Court has held 
that the FAA preempts state statutes that prohibit the arbitration of a particular type of claim,21 
state statutes that invalidate arbitration agreements on grounds different than those that invalidate 
other contracts,2) and state judicial rules that display vestiges of the ancient judicial hostility to 
arbitration.24 In these situations, lower courts have had no choice but to declare arbitration 
agreements enforceable under federal law even if they might be deemed unenforceable under 
state law. 25 
On the other side of the federalism balance, the savings clause of § 2 preserves for the 
states the ability to Mclare arbitration agreements invalid on grounds traditionally reserved for 
state law: common law contract defenscs to the enforceability of any contract. Thus, courts 
(either state courts or federal courts applying state contract law) have struck down arbitration 
\~ See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Sianford Junior Univ., 4B9 U.S. 46B, 477 (19B9) (quoting 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 3 t2 U.S . 52,67 (1941»); Moses H. Cone Mem" Hnsp., 460 U.S. at I; Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood 
& Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); see also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (preempting California 
statute requiring wage collection actions to be resolved in court). 
211 The Supreme Court has explained that it will find a slate law preempted by a Congressional Act when: (I) the 
fcdcrallaw expressly provides it displaces stale law ("express precmption"); (2) Congress intends the federal law in an 
area to "occupy the field" ("field preemption"); (3) it is impossible for a party to comply with both the state and federal 
law ("impossibility preemplion"); and (4) the challenged Slate law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" ("obstacle preemption"). See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade 
Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Impossibility and obstacle 
preemplion arc both subcategories of conflict preemption. [d.; se£' generally Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 
225, 22B (2000) (describing preemption categories). 
2\ NOlle of these decisions preempt a swte arbitration law-·laws that primarily address arbitration procedures 
and award enforcement, and almost uniformly further a pro-arbitration policy. Rather, the Court has preempted state 
laws on non-arbitration matters that contain "Iingcring anti-arbitralion scntimenl." Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. 
Palmiter. Arhitratioll Federalism: A State Role ill Comm C!,·cial Arhilration, 54 FI.A. L. REv. 175, 195 (2002). 
"'I" See Preston, 552 U.S. 346, 356-57 (preempting CaJifonlia law granting exclusive jurisdiction to Labor 
Commissioner to decide dispules arising under the Talent Agcncies Ael); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. I, 8 
(1984) (preempting provision of the California Franchise Invcstment Law thai required judicial, not arbitral, resolution 
of claims broughlunder Ihe slatute). 
! .I See Doctor' s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotlo, 517 U.S, 6BI, 6R5 (1996) (preempting Montana statute requiring 
specific type of notice in contract containing arbitration clause); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v . Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 
292-93 (1995) (preempting Alabama statute invalidating pre-dispule arbilration agreements in consumer conlraets). 
24 See Marmet Health Care Clr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. CI. 120 I (2012) (preempting West Virginia Supreme Court 
rule voiding as against public policy pre-dispute arbitration clauses in nursing home contracts with respect to 
negligence claims); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006) (preempting Florida judicial ntle 
that precluded arbitrators from deciding the legality of a an allegedly usurious contract containing an arbitration 
agreement); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 US. 52 (1995) (preempting New York law precluding 
arbitrators from awarding punilive damages). In contrast, Ihe FAA docs not preempt a state arbitration stanlle that 
merely diclates the ordcr of proceedings wilh respect to an arbitration and related third-party litigation, but does not 
regulale the viability or scope of the arbilralion agreemenl itself. See Vn/I, 489 U.S. al 471 . 
l S Exhibit A to this article charts all of the Supreme Court's FAA preemption decisions and describes the state 
law at issue, the Court's preemption holding, and the outcome of the case. 
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agrcements on contract law grounds such as lack of mutual assent,2(, unconscionability,27 an 
illusory agreement,2X or violating thc contract's implicd covenant of good faith and fair dealing.2'l 
As long as thc ground for rcvocation of the arbitration clause is a ground applicable to all 
contracts, and not just arbitration agrcements, the states are free to apply their law, free of FAA 
preemption. But what happens where courts apply a gcnerally applicable contract defcnsc, such 
as unconscionability, in a manner that arguably dc/acto disfavors arbitration? 
[I. THE AT& T MOBILITY DECISION 
The Court faced such a question in its 2010-11 term. In AT&T Mobility, LLC 1'. 
Concepcion,30 the Court hcld for the seventh time that the FAA preempted a state law, this time a 
state law that on its face was not anti-arbitration but was being applied by lower courts in a 
manncr that de/acto disfavored arbitration. The decision, while noteworthy for its condemnation 
of class arbitration, confirms the Court's intent to severely circumscribe the ability of state law to 
rcgulate the fairness of arbitratiOll, and to that cxtent is consistcnt with its prcvious FAA 
jurisprudencc. 
In AT&T Mobility, the Court ruled that the FAA preempts California's Discover Bank 
rule, which "classifTied] most collective-arbitration waivers in consumcr contracts as 
unconscionable.") I In its consumer cellular phone service contracts, AT&T Mobility, LLC 
("AT&T") included a pre-dispute arbitration agreement which, inter alia, prohibited plaintiffs 
from bringing class action arbitrations, instead requiring claims to be arbitrated on an individual 
basis. In 2006, the Concepcions sued AT&T in district court,. alleging that AT&T's practice 'of 
charging salcs tax on a phone advertised as "free~' was fraudulent. 31 In Deccmber 2006, after the 
Concepcions filed their claim, AT&T revised the arbitration agreement to provide that AT&T 
would pay a customer $7,500 if an arbitrator found in favor of a California customer on the mcrits 
of a customer dispute, and awarded more than the last AT&T settlement offer.33 Two years later, 
after the Concepcions' case was consolidated with a putative class action allcging, infer alia, 
identical claims of false advertising and fraud, AT&T moved to compel arbitration under the 
revised agreement.34 . 
The district court re'fused to enforce the arbitration agreement under the savings ' clause of 
FAA § 2. The court concluded that the class action waiver of the arbitration agreement was 
unconscionable because it had a dctcrrent effect on class actions and the efficient resolution. of 
third party claims.35 After the Ninth Circuit affirmed, on an interlocutory appeal, the dist~,ict 
2(. See. e.g .• Phillips v. Mazyck, 643 S.E.2d 172 (Va. 2007); Kloss v. Edward·D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d I (Mont. 
2002). 
27 See. e.g., State ex reI. Richmond Am. Homes of W. Va., Inc. v. Sanders, 717 S.E.2d 909 (W. Va. 2011); Rivera 
v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 259 P.3d 803 (N.M. 2011). 
2X See. e.g .• Penn v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, 269 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2001) (applying Indiana law). 
~o See. e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999) (applying Restatement of 
Contracts and South Carolina contract law). 
311 AT&T Mobil ity LLC v. Concepcion 13 I S. Ct. 1740 (20 II) . 
.11 fd. at 1746 . 
.1~ See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC. 584 F.3d 849,853 (9th Cir. 2009). rel"dslih 110m. AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (Concepcion was consolidated with Lasler in September 2006). -
J3 [d. 
34 Id. I, [d. 
28 
- ----------------'",.--.--_ .. _ ... - ._--- --------------, 
court's conclusion that the class-arbitration waiver was unconscionable and Lhat the FAA did not 
preempt the Discover Bank rule;1h AT&T sought review in the Supreme Court. 
On April 27, 20 II, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Scalia 
Uoined by Justices Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito), held that the FAA preempts 
California's Discover Balik interpretation of the state's unconscionability rule. The Court 
concluded that the Discover Bal1k rule created a di fferent law of unconscionability for class action 
waivers in adhesive arbitration contracts37 Thus, the FAA preempts the rule as it singles out 
arbitration clauses for suspect treatment.J~ 
The Court rejected the Concepcions' argument that the Court should defer to the 
California Supreme COUl1's analysis of its own unconscionability doctrine and instead use an 
objective determination on whether or not the rule is "tantamount to a rule of non-enforceability 
of arbitration agrcements ."J9 The majority was persuaded by research which demonstrated that 
state courts had become more likely to find an arbitration agreement unconscionable as opposed 
to other contracts 411 The Court also noted that althoughCalifomia's "rule does not require class-
wide arbitration, it allows any party to a consumer contract to demand it ex post," thus defeating 
the purposes of the FAA.41 
>h ld. at 853-69 . 
. 17 Thc Supreme Court noted that, under California law, a COllrt may refuse to enforce a contract that it finds "'to 
have bccn unconscionable at the timc it was madc, ", or it may '''limit the application of any unconscionable clause. '" 
AT&T Mobilily. 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5(a) (West 1985» ("A finding of 
unconscionability requires a 'procedural' and a 'substantive' element, the former focusing on 'oppression' or 'surprise' 
due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on 'overly harsh' or 'one-sided' results.") (citations omitted). In Discover 
BUllk \'. SII/ierior CO/II'I, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), ulirogaled hy AT&T Mohility. 131 S. Ct. 1740, the California 
Suprcmc Court applied this unconscionability law to class-action waivers in arbitration agreements and hcld: 
[W]hen. the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in 
which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small 
amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior 
bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers 
of consumers out of individually small sums of money, then ... the waiver 
becomes in practice the exemption of the pany "from responsibility for [its] 
own fraud, or willful injuty to the person or propeny of another." Under these 
circumstances, such waivers are unconscionable under California law and 
shuuld not be enforced. 
Id. at 1110 (citation omitted) . 
.1" AT&T idcntilied three principles from Discover Bunk that it contended courts applied differently to arbitration 
agreements than to other contraCIS: (I) thc effect on third parties; (2) the timing of the unconscionability decisions; and 
(3) the shock the conscience standard. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 
S. Ct. 1740 (201 I) (No. 09- 893) . 
. w Id. at 39. 
4" A T & T MobiliZl' , 131 S. Ct. at 1747. 
4' Id. at 1750. The Court discussed three characteristics of class arbitration that it concluded defeat the purposes 
of the FAA and hinder the flexible party-driven process of arbitration: (I) sacrifice of informality and spced; (2) a 
rcquisite increase in procedural formality; and (3) an increase in risks to defendants in the lack of judicial review. Id. at 
1751-52. Although the plurality expressly included the procedural expediency of arbitration as one of the FAA's 
purposes with which the Discover BUllk rule interferes, thc dissent referred to the Court's Deun Wille/, decision in 
which it specifically "reject[s] the suggestion that the overriding goal of the [FAA) was to promote the expeditious 
resolution of claims." 1£1. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 2 t 9 
( 1985». 
29 
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Justice Scalia's majority opinion was fuelcd by a singular distrust of class arbitration - a 
distrust that also appeared in the Court's 2010 decision in Stoll-Nielsen S.A . v. Anima/Feeds 
Il1temational Corporation.4~ In contrast. the AT& T Mobi/ity disscnt claimed that class 
proceedings are necessary to protect against small-value claims falling through the cracks of the 
Icgal system.43 Justice Scalia responded to the dissent's concern by stating that "[sJtates cannot 
rcquire a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated 
reasons.,,44 Thus, the CoU\1 wcnt so far as to characterizc class arbitration as not arbitratiOll at all 
within the meaning of the FAA, but a process that alters the fundamental attribules of arbitration. 
Justice Thomas "reluctantly join[ed]" the majority, but wrote ~'separat(!ly to explain how 
[he] would find [aJ limit" on contract defenses permitted by .FAA § 2.45 In his concurring 
opinion , Justice Thomas reasoned that the savings clause of the FAA perinits exceptions to thc 
enforceability of arbitration agreements only for defenses that "relate[) to the making of the 
[arbitration] agrcement.,,46 Because the Discover Bank rule did not relate to the formation of the 
arbitration agreement within the meaning of FAA §§ 2 arld 4, Justice Thomas concluded that it 
was prcemptcd by the FAA. While Justice Thomas' interpretation of FAA § 2 differed from prior 
Supreme Court jurisprudence and was not briefed or advocated by the parties. his vote was 
necessary for the 5-4 reversal. 
In the AT&T Mobility dissent, Justice Breyer Goined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor 
and Kagan) argued that California's Discover Bank rule "represents the 'application of a more 
general [unconscionability] principle. ",47 Because it is a rule of state law applicable to all 
contracts and not just arbitration agreements, it falls within the savings clause and the FAA 
should not preempt it.4~ Additionally, the dissent criticized the plurality's conclusion that class 
arbitration is lacking the "fundamental attribute[s]" of arbitration within the meaning of the FAA. 
Justice Breyer opined that barring class arbitration and forcing lower courts to enforce adhesive 
class arbitration waivers would "have the effect of depriving c1aimants of their c1aims:,4~ 
-11 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp .• '130 S. Cl. 1758 (2010). 
4.1 AT&T Mohility. 131 S. Ct. at 1760-61 (Breyer, J .• dissenting). 
4-l/d. at 1753 (majority opinion). 
4~ /d. at 1753-54 (Thomas. J .• concurring). Justice Thomas felt compelled to articulate his rcading of the savings 
clause bccausc, in past preemption cases. he dissented based on his view, first articulated in Allied-Bruce Termillix Cos. 
v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265. 284-97 (1995) (Thomas. 1 .• disscnting). that thc FAA does not apply in state courts. Sincc 
this case came lip throllgh the federal courts. that basis of dissent did not apply . 
.Ie. AT&T Mohility, 131 S. Cl. at 1754-55 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting 9 U.S.c. § 4 (20 I 0» . 
47/d. at 1757 (Breyer. J .• dissenting) (citing Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556. 564 (Cal. 2007». 
4' [d. 
40 [d. at 1761. Justicc Breyer asked the Concepcioll majority. "What rational lawycr would have signed on to 
represent the Coneepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim')" Id. (citing Carnegie 
v. Household In!'l, Inc .• 376 F.3d 656. 661 (7th Cir. 2004) ( ..... only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.")). In doing so, 
he cited an appellate court which recognized previously the "realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million 
individual suits. but zero individual suits ...... ld. 
30 
Finally, the dissent expressed deep concern for the impact of the decision on principles of 
federal ism: 
Through [the savings clause J. Congress reiterated a basic federal idea 
that has long informed the natllte of this Nation's laws. We have often 
expressed this idea in opinions that set forth presumptions. Here. 
recognition of that federalist ideal. embodied in specific language in 
this particular statute. should lead LIS to uphold California's law. not 
strike it down. We do not honor federalist principles in their breach.50 
Academic and media reaction to AT&T MohililJ' was swift and harsh:; I Much of the 
criticism focused on the certain death of class arbitration as a method to redress small dollar value 
claims through arbitration 52 Commentators agreed with the dissent that many consumers would 
not be able to pursue their claims, and thus vindicate their statutory rights, if they could not 
consolidate their claims with others into larger groups.53 [s AT&T Mobility such an unparalleled 
disaster - a "tsunami," as Professor Stemlight termed it?54 
III. AT&T MOBILITY AND FAA PREEMPTION 
In some ways, AT&. T Mohility is logically consistent with the Court's previous cases 
imposing FAA preemption. As in most of the Court's previous preemption cases (except 
Mastrobllono),55 the Court's decision resulted , in the imposition of arbitration on an unwilling 
disputant. This decision, like the previous ones, preempted a state law that did not involve 
arbitration procedures. And, like in its previous preemption opinions, the Court elevated 
principles of contractual autonomy over state law consumer protection regulations. 
so ld. at 1762 (citation omitted). 
51 See, C.g., Jean Sternlight, supra note 7; S.L Strong. Does Class Arbitration 'Change the Nafllre' 0/ 
Arhitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT& T and a Retum 10 Firsl Principles. HARV. NEGOT. L REv. (forthcoming). availahle al 
http://ssm.com/abstract=1791928;SarahCole.Colllinl/ing the Discl/ssion 0/ the AT&T v. Concepcion Decision: 
lrnp/icalhms for the Fullwe. ADR Prof Blog, Apr. 27. 2011. hltp:/lwww.indisputably.org/?p=2312 ("It would appear. 
that the era of class arbitration is over before it really cver began - unless Congress can be pcrsuaded to amend the 
FAA to permit class arbitration. at least in cases involving low value claims. where consumers arc unlikely to have 
practical recourse to a remedy through traditional bilateral arbitration."); Marcia Coyle. Dil'ided JlIstice.~ Back 
Mandalory Arhitration for CO/lSUlller Complain/s, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL. Apr. 28. 2011. ol'ailohle al 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp.!id= 120249 I 963074&slretum= I (quoting lawyer for Concepcions as stating '''[tJhe 
dccision will make it harder for people with civil rights. labor. consumer and other kinds of. claims that stem from 
corporate wrongdoing to join together to obtain their rightful compensation'''). 
52 Stemlight • .II/pro note 7. at 704 ("It is highly ironic but no less distressing that a case with a name meaning 
"conception" should come to signify death for the legal claims of many potential plaintiffs."); Sarah Cole. On Babies 
alld Balliwaler, supra note 7, at 464 ("most prcssing issue in consumer arbitration. in the wake of recent Supreme Court 
decisions, is the lack of a viable forum for consumers with low value claims"). 
~.\ See, e.g .• Myriam Gilles. AT&T Mohilil)' \'. Concepcion: Fmm UnC(msci(Jf1(Jbili~I' 10 Vindication 0.( Rights. 
SCOTUSOLOG. Sept. 15. 20 II. http://www.scotusblog.com/20 11i09/att-mobility-vs-concepcion-from-
unconscionability-to-vindication-of-rights (last visited Jan. 28,2012) ("The AT&T ruling is the real game-changer for 
class action litigation. as it permits most of the companies that touch consumers' day-to-day lives to place themselves 
beyond the reach of aggregate litigation by simply incorporating class waiver language into their standard-fonn 
contracts. "). 
S~ See Sternlight. TSlinami, sllpra note 7. 
55 Sec Exhibit A. 
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Indeed, the Court's very first FAA preemption case, Southland II Keating,~h preempted a 
California state law that, as interpreted by California's high court, provided a ground for the 
revocation of allY contract - just as in AT&T Mobility. In Southland. several 7-E1cven franchisecs 
sued franchisor Southland in California state court alleging various common law claims, as well 
as claims arising under the California Franchise Investmcnt Law (CFIL).57 After the claims were 
consolidated with other franchisees' similar claims, South land invoked the arbitration clause in 
lhe franehisc agreements and moved to compel arbitration of the action .5x Ullimately, the issue of 
the arbitrability of the CFIL claims made its way to the California Supreme Court, which held 
that they were not arbitrable in light of § 315 J 2 of the statute - a provision that voided any 
"condition, stipulation or provision purporting to bind [a franchisee] to waive compliance with 
any provision of [the CFIL)."SQ 
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding that the FAA preempted § 
31512 of the CFIL. Dismissing the dissent's contention that the savings clause preserves this 
defense to arbitration for the states, the Court concluded that § 31512 was not a ground for the 
revocation of any contract (and thus not within the scope of the savings clause), but was a 
"ground that exists for the revocation of arbitration provisions in contracts subject to the 
[CFIL).,,60 The Court reached this conclusion even though § 31512 on its face did not mention 
arbitration and presumably applied to many different kinds of agreements, not just arbitration 
agrccmcnts . ·When considered through the lens of Southland's preemption of a seemingly 
contract-neutral state law, AT&T Mobility paves no new ground. 
In some ways, however, this case appears to stretch the FAA preemption doctrine beyond 
its previous scope, as it reflects the Court's first preemption of a traditional common law defense 
to the enforcement of any contract (here, unconscionability).61 The Court found latent anti-
arbitration animu.s in California's unconscionability defense in the way that California courts 
applied the Discover Bank doctrine to arbitration agreements. 62 At thc core of previous 
preemption decisions was not a traditional common law defense to contracts that easily associated 
with the savings clausc."3 Those decisions involved the preemption of a state statute or rule that 
was enacted to remove forum choice from contracting parties (Southland, Pres/on, Allied-Bruce 
Terminix, and Peny) or was patently anti-arbitration (Cassarot/o and Mastrobuono (and post-
AT&T Mobili(v, Marmet»). 
Another striking diffcrence from prior preemption cases is the AT&T Mobility Cburt's 
measures to strip arbitrators of a power - the power to conduct class arbitration proceedings 
(unless all parties expressly agreed to them). In contrast, the Court's previous preemption cases 
endorsed arbitrators' broad powers to fashion procedures and remedies t6 suit the parties' needs 
~(. SeC' Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. I, 2-3 (J 984). 
~1 Id. at 4. 
~. Id. 
~. Id. at 10 (citing CAL. CORP. CODE § 315 I 2 (West I 977». The California high COUit interpreted this language to 
require judicial consideration of claims arising under the law. 
W' , 
Id. a I 1(, n. l l. 
hi Although Califomia codified the unconscionability doctrine (see CAL. elv. CODE * 1670.5(a) (West I 979}), 
and thus AT&T MohililY involved a Califomia statute as intefTlreted by California courts, unconscionability has long-
standing roots in the common law of contracts. 
h~ See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (20 II). 
(,J See Doctor's Assocs .. Inc. v. Casarotto. 517 U.S . 681. 687 (1996) ("[G ]eneraJly applicable conlract defenses, 
such as fraud. duress, or ll11COl1Sdol1obilily. may bc applied to in val idate arbitration agreements without contravening § 
2.") (emphasis added) . 
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and the dispute.M Ironically enough, the end result in Southland, which arose out of a purported 
class action of convenience store franchisee claims, was forcing unwilling franchisees into 
arbitration, possibly using class action-type procedures.65 The end result in AT&T Mobility is 
somewhat the inverse - forcing consumers who sought class arbitration into individual, small 
claims arbitration. 
Why didn't the Southland Court balk at sending franchisees into class arbitration? 
Possibly because the parties did not litigate the issue of the propriety or class arbitration in 
1984.66 Or was class arbitration in 1984 closer to FAA arbitration than it is in 2011? 
What was different in 1984 was that the FAA federalism see-saw still tipped towards the 
states, and the Supreme Court had just begun its expansion of the preemptive force of the FAA. 
In fact, as recently as 2009, before the Court's "third arbitration trilogy,,,67 the Court in Vaden 
stated that "[g]iven the substantive supremacy of the FAA, but the Act's nonjurisdictional cast, 
state courts have a prominent role to playas enforcers of agreements to arbitrate.,,6x The third 
arbitration trilogy, and, in particular, AT& T Mobility, strips the courts of one of the only doctrines 
remaining to play that enforcer role, raising serious federalism concerns.69 Despite the Vaden 
Court's polite nod to the states acknowledging that they have a "prominent role to play," state 
courts have few weapons left to police the faimess of arbitration agreements.70 
I V. FAA PREEMPTION POST-A T& T MOBILITY 
Where does AT&T Mobility leave the FAA preemption doctrine? States are now 
struggling to regulate the fairness of arbitration agreements sought to be enforced within their 
borders. It is now crystal-clear that states cannot enact substantive statutes either expressly or 
implicitly hostile to arbitration. States also cannot circumvent the enforceability of arbitration 
M See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52,56-57 (1995) (preempting state law that 
stripped arbitrators of power to award punitive damages). 
(.5 See Sou/h1and, 465 U.S. at 2-3. Interestingly, the Court noted that "as to the question whether the Federal 
Arbitration Act precludes a class action arbitration and any other issues not raised in the California courts, no decision 
by this Court would be appropriate at this time." Ia. at 17. 
(~, Jd. at 17 ("as to the question whether the Federal Arbitration Act precludes a class action arbitration and any 
other issues not raised in the California courts, no decision by this Court would bc appropriate at this time"). 
(.7 See Thomas Stipanowich, The Third Arhitratioll Trilogy: Stolt-Niell'ell, Rell/-ll-Cell/er, Concepcion and the 
Future ~rAmerican Arbitratiol1, 22 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 323 (2012) (labeling SIOI/-Nielsell, Relll-A-Center and AT&T 
MohilifJl as the third arbitration trilogy because they "reprcsent[] a milestone in American arbitration" as they 
"aggressively expand[] the 'revealed' penumbra of substantive arbitration law under the. Federal 'Arbitration Act and 
shore[] up the bulwarks of private, binding dispute resolution under standardized contracts of adhesion binding 
employees and consumers"). 
(.M Vaden v, Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 59 (2009). The Court reiterated this view post-AT&T Mohility in 
KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23, 24 (20 II) (holding that, even if a lower court concludes that some claims in a 
multi-claim action are not arbitrable, court must compel arbitration of remaining claims). 
(.9 Professor Stipanowich points out that language in dicta in Pen:1' 1'. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987), 
foreshadowed this preemption of unconscionability doctrine. Sec Stipanowich, supra note 67, at 356 (citing PeriJ', 482 
U.S. at 492 n.9). 
70 See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 59. Even more disturbing is the rcasoning of Justice Thomas' concurrence. Under his 
unprecedented and narrow reading of the savings clause, the only exceptions to §2'5 enforcement of arbitration clauses 
are common law contract defenses that go to the makillg of fhe arhitratioll agre<'mellf, rather than all common law 
defenses to the enforcement of any contract. If his view is adopted by other Justices in future FAA decisions, state law 
would have virtually no ability to successfully invalidate arbitration agreements. 
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agreements through administrative regulations that prefer administrative forums over arbitration 
for the resolution of disputes. And state courts cannot create common law rules that de (acto arc 
hostile to arbitration, even if 011 their face they treat all agreements equally. The Supreme Court's 
FAA preemption decisions have reduced the savings clause to a largely symbolic nod to 
federalism , toothless in its application. By over-preempting state law grounds for revocation of 
any contract, the Court has ignored federalism concerns and tipped the carefully prescribed 
balance of power away from the states, expanding the FAA even more 'than it had before. 
How can courts invalidate unfair arbitration agreements under the CUITent FAA over-
preemption regime? Some decisions emanating from states' high courts post-AT&T Mubility 
reflect unyielding FAA preemption of state law with respect to the enforceability of arbitration 
agrecments containing class action waivers.~ i Likewise, Professor Sternlight's analysis of federal 
court reaction in the six months after the case revealed that most decisions applied the AT&T 
Mubility holding rigorously, despite ample grounds for distinction from AT&T Mobility.72 
Howevcr, a few federal courts have been more willing to distinguish AT&T Mobility and 
strike down a class action waiver under the "vindicating statutory rights" doctrine. 73 Under this 
doctrine, derived from the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Mitsubish;74 that "so long as the 
prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral fontm, 
the [federal] statute [providing that cause of action] will continue to serve both its remedial and 
deterrent function," a disputant can argue that an arbitration agreement is unenforceable because 
an unfair aspect of the arbitration process would preclude that party from vindicating its statutory 
rights.75 
For example, in In Re American Express Merchants' Liligalion,16 a purported class action 
arising under federal antitrust laws, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reconsidered, in light of 
AT&T Mobility, its prior decisions that a class action waiver clause in a credit card agreement was 
- 77 
unenforceable under the FAA because "enforcement of the clause would effectively preclude 
any action seeking to vindicate the [plaintiffs'] statutory rights."7~ The Court of Appeals foulld 
that AT&T Mobility did not alter its prior analysis, which rested on a different ground than AT&T 
11 See, e.g., State ex rei. Richmond Am. Homes of W. Va., Inc. v. Sanders, 717 S.E.2d 909, 924 (2011) 
(upholding class action waiver in arbitration clause under AT&T Mohili~v but declaring clause unconscionable on other 
grounds); NAACP of Camden County. E. v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 24 A.3d 777 ,794-95 (2011) (upholding class action 
waiver but denying motion to compel arbitration on ground that arbitration provisions I,!cked mutual assent). 
1~ See Stcrnlight, .Il1prer notc 7, ai 708 (concluding that "most courts are rejecting 'all potcntial distinctions and arc 
insicad applying COllcepcioll broadly as a 'get out of class actions free' card"). 
lJ See, e.g., Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 6950 (LBS) (JCF), 20tl WL 2671813 at *3 
(S.D.N.Y July 7, 2011) (refusing to reconsider its holding in at Title VH action that an arbitration clause was 
unenforceable because plaintiffs would not be able to vindicate their statutory rights absent the availability of class 
proceedings and distinguishing AT&T Mobility). 
l' Mi/SIIbislti MII/tlr.\" Cnl1l, I ', Soler ChIJ'sler-Plymoll/h, Tnc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (t985). 
1; See Grecn Tree Fin, Corp,-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S: 79, 92 (2000) (recognizing in dicta that, if a party 
showed that pursuing its statutory claims through arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, and thus it could not 
vindicate its statlltory rights, a court could validly refuse to enforce a pre-dispute arbitration agreement). 
7(. SC'e 111 rr: Am. Express Merchants' Litig .. 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 20 12) (Amex Ill). 
n See 111 re Am. Express Merchants' Litig., 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 20 II) (Amex If); In re Am. Express 
Merchants' Litig., 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009) (Amex f). The Court of Appeals reconsidered Amex [ in light of the 
Supreme Court's subsequent n1ting in SIO//-Nielsen S.A. I'. Anima/Feeds 1m 'I COt])., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (20 I 0). 
1" Amex I, 554 F.3d at 304. 
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Mobility. 79 Rather, the Cout1 of Appeals recognized, "[h Jere ... our holding rests squarely 011 a 
'vindication of statutory rights analysis, which is part of the federal substantive law of 
arbitrability."'xo Because plaintiffs demonstrated through expert testimony Ihal pursuing their 
stalutory claims individually, as opposed to through class arbitration, would not be economically 
feasible, thereby "effectively depriving plaintiffs of the statutory protections of Ihe antitrust 
laws,"~1 the Second Circuit directed the district court to dcny defendant's motion to compel 
arbitration.~2 . 
A111ex II! does not equalize the federalism balance because it dealt with the federal law of 
arbitrability, not the preemption of an arguably conflicting state law . ~] However, states can 
distinguish AT&T Mobility on numerous grounds to limit its federalism impact.X4 Courts can 
limit it to the class action waiver contract, yet still find other grounds for unconscionability of the 
arbitration clause. Courts also can apply a contract-neutral state unconscionability doctrine to 
void a class action waiver. 85 
Additionally, if a primary reason parties try to void arbitration agreements is to avoid a 
process they perceive as unfair, then states can offer secondary protection to those parties in the 
fonn of regulation of the process. The Supreme Court has not ruled that a section of the FAA 
other than § 2 applies in state court or preempts conflicting slale law, nor has it held that state 
arbitration law is preempted to the extent it regulates arbitration procedures. In fact, the one time 
the Court considered and rejected an FAA preemption argument involved a state procedural law 
that governed the order of proceedings, not the viability of arbitration itseler. Thus, states can 
still enact procedural arbitration law that can have some impact on the integrity of the process, 
and then to some extent, address the concerns of disputants seeking to avoid an arbitration 
agreement. 
State courts can also seize upon thc "vindicating rights" federal law doctrine and carve 
out an exception to arbitrability under slate law if a party can show some aspect of the arbitration 
contract or agreement precludes it from being able to vindicate its state statutory rights in 
arbitration. Courts can still resuscitate the savings clause by applying relevant common law 
1q See Amex Ill, 667 F.3d at 214 (,"What Sioll-Nielsell and Concepcion do not do is require that all class-action 
waivers be deemed per se enforceable. That leaves open the question presented on this appeal: whether a mandatory 
class action waiver clause is enforceable even if the plaintiffs are able to demonstrate that the practical effect of 
enforcement would be to preclude their ability to bring federal antitntst claims."). 
~tI Id. at 213 (quoting Amex 1,554 F.3d at 320). 
8IId.at217. 
~2 /d. at 219-20. Professor Sarah Cole wrote about thl' Second Circuit"s decision: .. It would seem. tben. that a 
ptaintiff subject to a class action waiver in an arbitration agreement could attack that provision on the ground of 
unconscionability if it can show that bilateral arbitration would effectively prcclude it from vindicating il~ statutory 
rights. Although this analysis must be done on a case-by-case basis, according to the Second 'Circuit, it certainly gives 
plaintiffs a basis for challenging a class action waiver. American Express says that it is going to appeal the decision ." 
Sarah Cole, Class Aclial1 Waiver in Arbitralion Agreement Unenforceable, INDISPUTM1LY Bl.oG, Feb. 2. 2012, 
http://www.indisputably.orgl?p=3326. 
~3 The National Labor Relations Board carved out another non-state law based exception to AT&T MoM/iI)' in the 
labor and employment context, filiding that federal labor law bars class action waivers in labor and employment 
contracts. See D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.LR.B . No. 184 at *9 (2012). 
N4 Professor Stemlight lists several possible bases or distinction. See Sternlight, slIpra note 7. at 726-27. 
Nj This option remains open to the West Virginia State Supreme Court of Appeals on remand in MUrinel Healill 
Care Or .. Inc. v. Brmvn, t32 S. Ct. 1201, 1202 (2012) (On remand, the West Virginia court mllst consider whether, 
absent that general public policy. the arbitration clauses in Brown's case and Taylor's case are unenrorceable under state 
common law principles that are not specitic to arbitration and pre-cmpted by the FAI\). 
~6 See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. ofTrs. of Leland Sianford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468.470-79 (1989). 
35 
contract defcnses to the enforcement of arbitration agreements. Unless Congress amends the 
FAA to el iminate the savings clause altogether, the Supreme Court would be hard-pressed to find 
that the FAA preempts common law defenses to the enforcement of any contract. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There seems to be little doubt that AT&T Mubi/ity will have an adverse impact on 
consumer arbitration, as it effectively eliminates the states' ability to preserve class arbitration as 
a procedural method of aggregating low-value claims. In my view, the Court's decision differs 
from its prior preemption cases in both the type of rule preempted and its respect for arbitrators' 
powers. These differences contribute to the resulting over-preemption of the FAA. 
Yet, despite the Court's consistent message to the states that there is no room to 
circumvent the FAA's ironclad support of arbitration agreements, I remain hopeful that - even 
post AT&T Mobility - lower state and federal courts will find ways to counter the seemingly over-
preemptive, super-status of the FAA. The FAA preempts only state laws, not federal laws, thus, 
federal unconscionability law may still invalidate a class arbitration waiver. In addition, other 
federal statules may trump the FAA, such as the Securities Exchange Act of 1934's anti-waiver 
provision, which may prevent the enforcement of a class arbitration waiver in the securities 
context. X7 Finally, like the Second Circuit did in Amex III. courts can give more teeth to the 
"vindicating statutory rights" ground as the ultimate policer of the faimcss of arbitration, and thus 
rebalance the allocation of power between the states and federal government in the arbitration law 
arena. 
"7 See Barbara Black, Arhi/ra/iol1 of/nves/ors' Claims Againsr/ssliers: AI11dea Whose Time Has Come?, 75 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 116-18 (2012) (arguing that a class action waiver in the securities context could violate anti-
waiver provisions of federal securities laws because it would weaken investors' ability to recover under those laws) . 
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Exhibit A 
Case name Year Law at issue Preem~tion? Outcome 
Southland Corp. 1984 § 31512 of Yes, of California Convenience store 
v. Keating California Supreme Court's ruling franchisees must 
Franchise 011 anti-arbitration state bring their CFlL 
Investment Law statute claims in 
requiring judicial arbitration, possibly 
resolution of claims using class 
procedures 
Perry v. Thomas 1987 California Labor Yes, of California Kidder Peabody 
Law § 229 allowing Supreme Court's could force its 
wage collection refusal under anti-arb broker into 
actions to be state statute to compel arbitration 
resolved in court, arbitration of securities 
regardless of broker's claim against 
arbitration firm for commissions 
agreement 
Volt Information 1989 § 1281 of No; affirmed Califomia Enforced CAA in 
Sciences v. Bd. California Court of Appeals' construction 
of Trs. of Leland Arbitration Act denial of contractor's contract; stayed 
Stanford Junior allowing stay of motion to compel arbitration; allowed 
Univ. arbitration pending arbitration in favor of litigation to proceed 
outcome of related University; arbitration with third party 
litigation with third procedural rule 
party 
Allied-Bruce 1995 Alabama statute Yes, of Alabama Homeowners had to 
Terminix Cos. v. invalidating pre- Supreme Court's arbitrate claims 
Dobson dispute arbitration refusal to compel against termite 
agreements in arbitration under anti- company 
consumer contracts arbitration state statute 
Mastrobuono v. 1995 New York judicial Yes; reversed Seventh Pennittcd recovery 
Shearson rule precluding Circuit vacatur of for investors from 
Lehman Hutton arbitrators from punitive damages completed 
awarding punitive award under anti- arbitration 
damages arbitration state'judieial 
rule 
Doctor's Assocs. 1996 Montana statute Yes; reversed Montana Franchisees forced 
v. Cassarotto requiring specific Supreme Court's into arbitration 
type of notice in refusal to enforce 
contract PDAA in franchise 
agreement under anti-
arb state statute 
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Exhibit A - Continued 
Case name Year Law at issue PreemQtion? Outcome 
Buckeye 2006 Florida judicial rule Yes; reversed Florida Borrowers forced 
Check precluding arbitrators Supremc Court's refusa l to arbitrate their 
Cashing, Inc . from deciding legality to pennit arbitrators to claim of usury 
v. Cardegna of contract containing decide whether allegedly 
arbitration agreement usurious contract was 
void ab initio for 
illegality 
Preston v. 2008 California statute Yes , reversed California Attorney allowed 
Ferrer allowing Court of Appeals' grant to proceed with 
administrative forum of stay of arbitration fee claim against 
for claims arising pending proceedings Judge Alex in 
under Talent Agencies before Labor arbitration 
Aet Commissioner under 
anti-arbitration state 
statute 
AT&T 2011 California judicial Ycs, of California Consumer forced 
Mobility LLC decision declaring Supreme Court ' s anti- to bring 
v. Concepcion class arbitration arbitration judicial rule arbitration claim 
waIvers intcrpreting state on an individual, 
unconscionable in unconscionability statute not class, basis 
most consumer 
agreements 
Mannet 2012 West Virginia Yes, remanding back to Highest state 
Health Care Supreme Court rule West Virginia Supreme court forced to 
Ctr. v. Brown voiding as against Court to decide reconsider its 
public policy pre- unconscionability of own state law 
dispute arbitration contract apart from anti-
clauses in nursing arbitration public policy 
home contracts with rule 
respect to negligence 
claims 
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